Beyond access and benefit-sharing : lessons from the emergence and application of the principle of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in agrobiodiversity governance by Tsioumani, Elsa
Tsioumani, Elsa (2017) Beyond access and benefit-sharing : lessons 
from the emergence and application of the principle of fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing in agrobiodiversity governance. In: The Commons, Plant 
Breeding and Agricultural Research. Routledge. (In Press) , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/61745/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 
 
CHAPTER xxxx 
Beyond access and benefit-sharing: lessons from the emergence and application of the 
principle of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in agrobiodiversity governance 
 
Elsa Tsioumani 
ERC Research Fellow, BeneLex Project, Strathclyde Centre for Environmental Law and 
Governance 
 
Introduction 
This chapter assesses the application of the concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
(Tsioumani 2014; Morgera 2016). First, it briefly explains the emergence of the concept in 
the context of the evolving principles of governance of agricultural biodiversity. Second, the 
chapter addresses the Multilateral System (MLS) for access to and fair and equitable benefit-
sharing from the use of plant genetic resources (ABS) of the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA ), which is arguably the most 
sophisticated ABS system in international law (Halewood et al. 2013b; Kamau and Winter 
2013; Guneratne 2012; Biber-Klemm and Cottier 2006; Chiarolla 2012; Correa 1999; Helfer 
2004; Raustiala and Victor 2004; Oberthur et al 2011; Oguamanam 2006; Cabrera Medaglia 
et al. 2013; Chiarolla et al. 2013; Morgera et al 2014). Third, it explores (lack of) benefit-
sharing applications in intellectual property rights (IPR) instruments and related human rights 
concerns. Concluding remarks on identified complexities, contradictions and weaknesses 
indicate that, despite promise and good intentions, the concept of fair and equitable benefit-
sharing has failed to inject fairness and justice in agricultural research and development, or 
promote agrobiodiversity conservation, including through ensuring the continued contribution 
of smallholder farmers. 
1. The Evolution of the Global Governance of Plant Genetic 
Resources 
The evolution of principles of governance of plant genetic resources can be pictured as 
following: 
Customary exchanges and informal seed systems 
Ļ 
Public agricultural research 
Ļ 
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Privatization of genetic resources via plant breeders¶ rights (PBRs) and patents 
Ļ 
Common heritage approach via the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture 
Ļ 
Nationalization of genetic resources and access regulations via the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) 
 
Since the earliest crop domestications, agricultural development has been based on farmeUV¶
traditional varieties, developed through collective systems of innovation and conservation 
through seed saving, sharing and use (Halewood et al. 2013a). Exchanges were regulated on a 
customary basis, largely at the community level, and included both informal ones and more 
organized systems, such as seed fairs and community seed banks. 
A series of historic events led to the transformation of agriculture and the global redistribution 
of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA). Colonization resulted in a vast 
flow of agricultural species from the Americas to Europe and from South to North. Botanic 
gardens and other ex situ facilities were established, mainly in the North, which stored 
samples of agricultural varieties coming mainly from developing countries, the centres of 
domestication of major agricultural crops. During the 20th century, the green revolution 
dramatically transformed agriculture through scientific and technological advances. Plant 
breeding was professionalized and the commercial seed sector emerged. These trends led to a 
spread of monocultures of genetically uniform high-yielding crop varieties and the erosion of 
agricultural biodiversity, making agricultural production vulnerable in the face of threats such 
as pests and extreme environmental conditions (FAO 1993). At the same time, customary 
farmer practices and varieties and traditional seed systems were marginalized and in cases 
criminalized, in favour of scientific, public or corporate-led research supported by intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) (Tsioumani et al. 2016; De Schutter 2009; Mooney 1998). These trends 
put at risk the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, in developing but also in developed 
countries.  
The need for continued exchanges of material in the context of the green revolution and the 
realization of the risks of genetic erosion provided the basis for the international regulation of 
PGRFA and the establishment of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) in 1971 (Tsioumani 2016; Özgediz 2012). The international agricultural 
UHVHDUFKFHQWUHVXQGHUWKHDXVSLFHVRIWKH&*,$5VWRUHGDODUJHSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHZRUOG¶V
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agricultural germplasm (Fowler et al. 2000; Pistorius 1997: 33; Fowler 1994). At the time, 
international law was silent with respect to the conditions for access to and use of PGRFA, 
both in situ and in the CGIAR system; similarly, most national legislations did not regulate 
access to PGRFA, either in situ or in genebanks. PGRFA were thus considered to be in the 
public domain, available to anyone for any purpose, without benefit-sharing or conservation 
obligations (Halewood et al. 2013a: 12). Still, most agricultural research at the time was 
conducted by public institutions, and the results of the work were shared (Rose 2004).  
The growing application of IPRs and the gradual privatization of agricultural research and 
development resulted in tensions that challenged the CGIAR practices. At the core of the 
tensions were perceived inequities concerning who bore the cost of conservation and who 
benefitted more from its use, arguably private companies in developed countries. Besides, 
concerns about the risk of the commodification of PGRFA intensified as a result of the case 
of Diamond vs. Chakrabarty in the US, which opened the way to the patenting of living 
organisms (Kevles 1994; Carolan 2010; Jasanoff 2001).  
IPRs are supposed to foster and reward creativity and innovation, including to address global 
challenges such as food security. As explained in detail in other chapters of this book (see, in 
particular, the introduction and Dutfield), the IPRs mainly in use in the field of agricultural 
development, PBRs and patents, are widely criticized as designed to suit the needs of 
developed countries. They have been associated with reducing the developmental choices of 
developing countries, intensifying control by agrochemical companies, raising the cost of 
agricultural inputs, and risking the food security of vulnerable groups, including smallholder 
farmers (Correa 1995; Dutfield, 2000; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002; 
Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Drahos 1996). )DUPHUV¶YDULHWLHVGRQRWVDWLVI\the criteria for 
protection and cannot be covered by either PBRs or patents, they were thus further 
marginalized. 
Membership of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV Convention), which has established PBRs, was boosted with the adoption of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, as WTO Member States are required to 
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis 
system1. Although countries are free to identify a system to suit their particular agricultural 
and socioeconomic conditions, UPOV, as a ready-made framework, is obviously an easy 
choice (Correa 2015). Ratification seems to be promoted also by technical advice provided to 
developing countries (De Schutter 2009). Furthermore, ratification of UPOV 1991 or 
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adoption of complying legislation is promoted by developed countries through free trade 
agreements, while bilateral pressure is also exerted to introduce patent protection for plants, 
animals and biotechnological innovations, exceeding even the TRIPS standards (Heath and 
Kamperman Sanders 2007; GRAIN 2014; Correa 2009; Brennan and Kilic 2015). Developing 
country membership is thus constantly increasing. 
Exceptions to PBRs, including the permitted use of protected varieties as the source material 
RIIXUWKHUEUHHGLQJEUHHGHUV¶H[FHSWLRQDQGWKHUH-XVHRIVDYHGVHHGVE\IDUPHUVIDUPHUV¶
privilege) have been gradually restricted in subsequent revisions of the Convention. Similar 
e[FHSWLRQVDLPLQJWRSURWHFWIDUPHUV¶DQGEUHHGHUV¶DFWLYLWLHVDUHPRUHOLPLWHGXQGHUSDWHQW
law as patents allow its holder to exercise the greatest control over the use of patented 
material (see Dutfield in this book).  
A vast literature examines ethical considerations and fairness- and equity-related concerns 
posed by IPRs granted for living organisms (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002). These 
concerns are exacerbated by the (mis)application of the IPR system, dubbed as µbiopiracy¶2 
(Mooney 1998; Aoki 1998). ,QDGGLWLRQµIPRs appear to slow the free flow of germplasm 
exchange, slow the diffusion of new knowledge, upset the balance between basic and applied 
research, and erode scientific inWHJULW\¶+HVVSRVLQJREVWDFOHVWRSXEOLFUHVHDUFK 
However, it was mainly the misappropriation and privatization of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge that resulted in rising equity and justice-related concerns: farmers and 
governments in developing countries realized that the introduction of IPRs resulted in a major 
DV\PPHWU\QRWLQJWKDWµWKHLUUDZPDWHULDOVZHUHWREHH[FKDQJHGIUHHO\ZKLOHSDWHQWVZHUHWR
be placeGXSRQWKHILQLVKHGYDULHWLHV¶0RRQH\ restricting their availability. This 
was considered as unfair and inequitable or at least morally unjust from the perspective of 
provider countries and farmers. It was also a major attack to the previous treatment of 
PGRFA and related knowledge as public goods. Following the acknowledgment of the need 
for some form of legal arrangement regarding access to stored germplasm, the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture was adopted in 1983.  
The non-binding International Undertaking attempted to apply the principle of common 
KHULWDJHWR3*5)$GHFODULQJWKDWµplant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and 
consequently should be aYDLODEOHZLWKRXWUHVWULFWLRQ¶3. Significantly, the principle of common 
heritage would cover all plant genetic resources, includinJµQHZO\GHYHORSHGYDULHWLHV¶4. The 
initial strategic and legal response was thus not to restrict access or share the benefits of 
PGRFA but make them freely accessible to farmers and breeders around the world 
(Kloppenburg 2014; Aoki 2009). This ± retrospectively radical ± approach can be explained 
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in the light of the asymmetry introduced by IPRs: the main problem was not that seed 
companies were using PGRFA for free, but that they were restricting access to materials that, 
as a matter of reciprocity, ought to have been shared. 
The framework established by the Undertaking sought to benefit humanity as a whole, DQGµto 
support major increases in agricultural production, especially in developing countries¶ 5 . 
However, distribution of the benefits was left to national governments¶responsibility6, and no 
mechanism was established to address the needs of specific fractions of humanity, (i.e. most 
vulnerable or less equipped for agricultural R&D). An internationally coordinated network of 
centers, including the pre-existing CGIAR centers, would operate under the FAO auspices 
DQGDVVXPHWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRKROG3*5)$FROOHFWLRQVµIRUWKHEHQHILWRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
FRPPXQLW\ DQGRQ WKHSULQFLSOHRIXQUHVWULFWHG H[FKDQJH¶7. The absence of formal benefit-
sharing arrangements lies in the strong belief that benefits would flow to developing countries 
in the form of distribution of PGRFA and related information. Noble in its intentions, the 
architecture seemed to ignore the global inequities regarding distribution of the 
infrastructures, knowledge and skills, which are necessary to make use of an open system 
such as the one created by the Undertaking (Louafi and Welch 2014). It further revealed the 
central weakness of the common heritage approach in international law: that it is largely 
PRWLYDWHGE\6WDWHV¶GHVLUHIRUDFFHVVWRUHVRXUFHVUDWKHUWKDQE\JHQXLQHFRPPXQLty interest 
in their protection (Brunnée 2008).   
The International Undertaking did not resolve the impasse between developed and developing 
countries largely associated with IPRs and equity-related concerns. Eight developed countries 
signed it with reservations8, reluctant to allow the principle of common heritage to apply to 
modern varieties, and giving priority to IPRs. Developing countries, in turn, considered 
impractical the attempt to apply the principle of common heritage against IPRs. Identifying 
themselves as providers and thus owners of genetic resources, they pushed for application of 
the principle of national sovereignty over natural and genetic resources, eventually embedded 
in the CBD.  
If IPRs created a major enclosure to the previous systems of exchange, the principle of 
national sovereignty over natural and genetic resources aimed to defend the rights of countries 
providing such resources by creating a second, defensive enclosure. In the words of Halewood 
et al., µif developed countries were able to exercise restrictive control over advanced 
biologically based technologies using intellectual property rights, developing countries could 
exercise their sovereign rights to regulate and restrict access to the biological and genetic 
resources within their borders¶ (Halewood et al. 2013b: 6). 
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The CBD, a legally binding treaty, recognizes that the authority to determine access to genetic 
resources rests with national governments and is subject to national legislation. The CBD 
introduced the concepts of the prior informed consent of the country providing such resources 
and of the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their commercial or other 
utilization9, referring prominently to fair and equitable benefit-sharing as its third objective10. 
Benefit-sharing is thus linked to the principle of national sovereignty, and appears to have a 
balancing function against the privatization of genetic resources via IPRs. 
The shift in principles can be further justified due to the growing expectations of the 
commercial value of biodiversity (Petit et al. 2001; Batta Bjørnstad 2004) and its potential use 
for development purposes (Raustiala and Victor 2004). The emergence of the biotechnology 
industry in the 1990s and of a market for biodiversity-based products was at the centre of 
these expectations. Benefit-sharing in this sense would be linked not only to the 
commercialization of biodiversity-based products but also to the emergence of market-based 
approaches to biodiversity management such as payments for ecosystem services (Morgera 
2016).  
In conclusion, the concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in the context of agricultural 
biodiversity use can be conceptualized as following: linked to the principle of national 
sovereignty, as a defensive tool to balance the injustices enshrined in the IPR system; and 
linked to development purposes, as a tool to benefit from the emerging biodiversity market. A 
third conceptualization can be found under the ITPGRFA concept RIIDUPHUV¶ULJKWV11, which 
understands benefit-sharing as a tool to reward farmers and enable their continued 
contribution, thus linking it to conservation concerns and rural livelihoods.  
Were developing countries accurate in their expectations? Adoption of the CBD was 
considered a victory for the developing world, but did adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 
mean that many of these gains were weakened (Aoki 2009)? The next section will assess its 
application and use at the inter-State level, on the basis of a technical analysis of the MLS. 
2. Governance of Agricultural Biodiversity and Fair and 
Equitable Benefit-Sharing  
The current picture of global governance of agricultural biodiversity, from conservation to use 
in R&D, is largely defined by the CBD, the ITPGRFA, and IPR-related instruments. While 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing is an objective of environmental treaties, the concept is not 
enshrined in the IPR instruments. 
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A. The ITPGRFA Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing 
The shift in principles triggered by the CBD negotiations had an immediate influence on the 
FAO realm. With the adoption of the CBD, the Nairobi Final Act12 recommended adjusting 
the International Undertaking in line with the CBD, providing the basis for the negotiations of 
the ITPGRFA.  
The objectives of the ITPGRFA are the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA and the 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with the CBD, 
for sustainable agriculture and food security13. The core of the Treaty is the MLS, which 
facilitates access to, and exchange of, a specified list of crops in Annex I considered vital for 
food security and agricultural research. It also institutionalizes the sharing of the benefits 
arising from the utilization of these resources: the Treaty regulates both monetary and non-
monetary benefit-sharing (i.e. exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology, 
and capacity building). In addition, facilitated access to Annex I PGRFA is recognized as a 
benefit in itself14 (Tsioumani 2004).  
The MLS DLPHGWRUHVSRQGWRWKHVSHFLILFLWLHVRIDJULFXOWXUDOELRGLYHUVLW\DQGWKHµSXEOLF
JRRG¶QDWXUHRI3*5)$ and basic scientific research in general (Cooper et al. 1994; 
Halewood et al. 2013b), for which the CBD bilateral system of exchanges was considered 
unsuitable (Chiarolla et al. 2013). PGRFA exchange is indispensable for the continuation of 
agricultural research, as well as for the adaptation of key crops to the new conditions brought 
about by climate change, and plant pests and diseases. Moreover, when it comes to crop 
genetic resources, all countries are interdependent and identification of the country of origin is 
often difficult, given the millennia of agricultural history15.   
Collections of Annex I crops that are under the management and control of Parties and in the 
public domain, as well as those held by the CGIAR centers, are to be automatically included 
in the MLS and exchanged using the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA)16. The 
SMTA is a standardized private law contract between a provider and recipient (user) of 
material17. Other holders, including the private sector, are encouraged to include such 
material voluntarily in the system to achieve larger coverage. While providers are usually 
public or international genebanks, users can be organizations, private entities or individuals. 
In practice, mostly public-sector breeders use the MLS (López Noriega, Wambugu and 
Mejías 2013; ITPGRFA 2015).  
Monetary benefit-sharing is currently operated through the Benefit-sharing Fund (FAO 2006). 
The original idea was that this fund would be replenished through user-based payments on the 
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basis of the SMTA provisions, following commercialization of products developed from 
material accessed through the MLS. The SMTA provides for mandatory payments to the 
Benefit-sharing Fund according to two monetary benefit-sharing options: 
- a default scheme, according to which a recipient that commercializes a plant product 
incorporating material from the MLS that is not available to others for further research and 
breeding LHLWLVSDWHQWHGZLOOSD\RIJURVVVDOHVWRWKH7UHDW\¶V%HQHILW-sharing Fund, 
less 30% (to cover expenses), i.e. 0.77%18 (Moore and Goldberg 2010); and 
- an alternative, whereby recipients pay 0.5% of gross sales on all products of the species they 
accessed from the MLS, regardless of whether the products incorporate the material accessed 
and regardless of whether or not the new products are available without restriction19. 
Voluntary payments are encouraged when a recipient commercializes a plant product that 
incorporates material from the MLS if that product is available without restriction to others 
for further research and breeding20. Under the direction of the Governing Body and through a 
project-based approach (FAO 2007), the Benefit-sharing Fund would then allocate the 
acquired funds to particular activities designed to support farmers and breeders in adapting 
crops to changing needs and demands, particularly farmers in developing countries who still 
conserve crop diversity in their fields. A lack of conceptual clarity is observed: Monetary 
benefit-sharing refers both to the accumulation of monetary benefits through the SMTA 
(user-based benefit-sharing) and to the distribution of monetary benefits through the Benefit-
sharing Fund. 
The projects funded through the Benefit-sharing Fund produce both improved genetic 
resources ± which are to enrich the MLS ± but also non-monetary benefits, such as 
information or training. Such non-monetary benefits are being generated and shared despite 
WKHIDFWWKDW3DUWLHV¶REOLJDWLRQVWRVKDUHQRQ-monetary benefits are linked to other 
mechanisms and not to the Benefit-sharing Fund directly (Galluzzi et al. 2014), blurring the 
lines between monetary and non-monetary benefit-sharing and highlighting the close 
interlinkages between relevant mechanisms. The Global Information System for instance is 
the mechanism specifically built for information exchange (Ker et al. 2013)21.  
It can be argued that non-monetary benefit-sharing can be used to build the capacities 
required for facilitated access to, and use of, PGRFA, which could potentially result in 
commercialization and monetary benefit-sharing (Louafi 2013). Non-monetary benefit-
sharing, in the form of information exchange, technology transfer and capacity building, is 
thus instrumental in addressing the unequal capacities of countries and communities to benefit 
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from the ITPGRFA, and thus bridging the capacity, fairness and equity gap in agriculture and 
agrobiodiversity conservation. 
A set of challenges have however arisen with regard to the ability of the MLS to generate and 
share monetary benefits (Frison et al 2011). As a result, no user-based payments have been 
UHDOL]HGVLQFHWKH7UHDW\¶VHQWU\LQWRIRUFH7KHBenefit-sharing Fund has been operating 
solely on the basis of donor country voluntary contributions (ITPGRFA 2013; Tsioumani et 
al. 2017). The sub-sections below address legal and policy challenges related to the 
accumulation and the distribution of monetary benefits. 
1. Accumulation of Benefits  
The lengthy time-period required for research, development and commercialization partly 
explains the failure to generate and share commercial benefits from the SMTA (ITPGRFA 
2013). There is more than that though. The first challenge concerns the relationship between 
benefit-sharing and IPRs. Monetary benefit-sharing takes the form of compensation when 
material is taken out of the MLS, i.e. when there is a restriction in use associated with the 
patenting of PGRFA. Such restrictions are arguably incompatible with the open exchange 
systems needed for food security and agricultural biodiversity conservation (Louafi and 
Welch 2014). This illustrates a fundamental contradiction inherent in the Treaty system: 
monetary benefit-sharing was designed as a central tool for revenue generation to fund the 
ITPGRFA goals; at the same time, monetary benefit-sharing is tied to restrictions in use, 
which threaten the very essence of the system and its goal of food security, by impoverishing 
its material base (Helfer 2003, Frison 2016). It may also be seen as an indication that Treaty 
drafters designed monetary benefit-sharing as a disincentive to patenting22, prioritizing 
continued unrestricted exchanges of PGRFA for research and breeding.  
Three additional factors greatly impact effectiveness of the system (Frison 2016). First, 
coverage of the MLS is not comprehensive (e.g. soybean, sugarcane, tomato and coffee are 
absent). Notably, some of these crops attracted significant research effort resulting in patented 
material, and their inclusion could result in mandatory benefit-sharing payments according to 
the SMTA obligations. Second, as noted above, the MLS only covers public and CGIAR 
collections of Annex I PGRFA. This means that most material in the MLS is available 
elsewhere without adherence to the benefit-sharing terms of the SMTA. Third, many Parties 
to date failed to notify the Secretariat of their PGRFA included in the MLS, thus making this 
material inaccessible to users due to lack of awareness. That said, ratification by the US in 
March 2017 is expected to close one of the major loopholes and allow for more 
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comprehensive coverageRQFHWKHFRXQWU\¶VYDVWFURSFROOHFWLRQVDUHQRWLILHGWREHLQFOXGHG
in the MLS. 
On the user side, in practice most of the organizations that choose to take material from the 
MLS and incorporate it in new products do not restrict access to the improved material for 
further research and breeding purposes and are thus not obliged to share monetary benefits. 
Commercial users who would be more likely to trigger monetary benefit-sharing requirements 
have consistently chosen to access material from other sources, not the MLS (CGIAR 2015). 
A series of studies undertaken in the ITPGRFA framework has explored obstacles to the 
realization of monetary benefits and confirmed that projections of benefit flows will be 
µPRGHUDWHDWEHVW¶and will take even longer than expected (Moeller and Stannard 2013). 
Consequently, a Working Group was specifically mandated in 2013 WRµHQKDQFHWKH
functioning of the Multilateral System¶ by, inter alia, developing measures to increase user-
based paymenWVDQGFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKH7UHDW\¶V%HQHILW-sharing Fund, as a priority. 
µAGGLWLRQDOPHDVXUHV¶(referring to a possible expansion of the Annex I list of crops) are also 
envisaged. This item remains highly controversial. Developing countries consider the 
generation and sharing of financial benefits on the basis of the current list a necessary 
prerequisite for any discussion on expanding coverage, in order to retain their possibilities to 
gain from their resources by striking bilateral agreements with users (Tsioumani 2014b). 
Research suggested upfront payments with no or low restrictions in use may be better suited 
to generate benefits, ensure continued exchanges and increase legal certainty (Seyoum and 
Welch 2013). Indeed, the Working Group is envisaging a subscription system for access to 
MLS-PGRFA, meaning that subscribed users would need to pay before access (Tsioumani 
2015). The ITPGRFA Governing Body requested to develop such a subscription system and 
incorporate it into a revised SMTA (FAO 2016)23.  
2. Distribution of Benefits 
Distribution of monetary benefits is operated through the Benefit-sharing Fund via a project-
based approach. The Benefit-sharing Fund is mandated to prioritize projects that support not 
only the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity, but also the livelihoods 
of farmers and rural communities. According to the Treaty text, benefits should flow 
primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers24.  
Twenty-two projects were funded under the third cycle. Most of them are run by international 
and national agricultural research centers, two are run by NGOs, and one by an association of 
indigenous organizations25. Channelling benefits to farmers is easier said than done, given the 
limited capacities of most farmer communities and organizations to reach international 
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funding through the complex Benefit-sharing Fund application and project execution 
procedures. While this project-based approach arguably combines elements of inter-state 
benefit-sharing regulation with implementation at the local level, its results illustrate the 
challenges that an international organization faces to reach directly communities on the 
ground, and vice versa.  
An additional challenge lies in the diversity of the ITPGRFA system users. The Treaty serves 
a wide and diverse set of users in the entire spectrum of agricultural production, with different 
or contradictory needs: public research institutes, smallholder farmers, companies big and 
small, in developing and developed countries, actors engaged in commercial or non-
commercial research, in formal and informal seed systems. The current realities of 
agricultural research and development characterized by high market concentration (Tsioumani 
et al. 2016)SXWDWULVNQRWRQO\IDUPHUV¶LQQRYDWLRQEXWDOVRSXEOLFDJULFXOWXUDOUHVHDUFK$VD
result, agricultural research centers in developing countries also compete for funding under 
the Treaty. The Treaty struggles to find and maintain a balance between modern scientific 
methods of identifying and developing new varieties on the basis of material in ex situ 
FROOHFWLRQVDQGIDUPHUV¶WUDGLWLRQDODJUR-ecological approaches. It remains a matter for 
consideration though, whether the current approach serves well the objectives of sustainable 
agriculture and global food security (Swiss Government 2015, Frison 2016). It has been 
questioned for instance whether a competitive project-based approach is appropriate to meet 
challenges related to distributional equity, the public value of PGRFA and the required 
cooperation among different States and actors to address food security concerns (Louafi 
2013).  
B. IPR-related Instruments and Benefit-6KDULQJ8329DQGWKH75,36µ&%'
$PHQGPHQW¶ 
The failure of the ITPGRFA MLS to generate monetary benefits should be seen in the broader 
context of international law and policy governing agricultural R&D. Unlike the 
environmental treaties, there is no explicit requirement related to fair and equitable benefit-
sharing in IPR instruments, the argument being that IP protection benefits society as a whole 
by promoting innovation. In the response of UPOV to the CBD Secretariat, requesting for 
contributions to the negotiations on access and benefit-sharing (UPOV 2003; Cabrera 
Medaglia 2010; Dutfield 2011), UPOV highlights the importance of access to genetic 
UHVRXUFHVWRHQVXUHSURJUHVVLQSODQWEUHHGLQJDQGµWKHUHE\WRPD[LPL]HWKHXVHRIJHQHWLF 
UHVRXUFHVIRUWKHEHQHILWRIVRFLHW\¶7KHEUHHGHU¶VH[HPSWLRQZKHUHE\DFWVGRQHIRUWKH
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SXUSRVHRIEUHHGLQJDUHQRWVXEMHFWWRDQ\UHVWULFWLRQLVFRQVLGHUHGWREHDQµLQKHUHQWEHQHILW-
VKDULQJSULQFLSOH¶ (UPOV 2003). Same goes for the compulsory exceptiRQWRWKHEUHHGHU¶V
right regarding acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes (which could apply to 
WKHDFWLYLWLHVRIVXEVLVWHQFHIDUPHUVDQGWKHRSWLRQDOIDUPHU¶VSULYLOHJH to replant farm-saved 
seeds from a protected variety. The Council of UPOV expressed its concern over benefit-
sharing measures that could introduce barriers to progress in breeding, despite the glaring 
OLPLWDWLRQVWKDWWKH8329WH[WVSODFHRQWKHIDUPHU¶VSULYLOHJH In addition, the presumption 
that technological developments benefit society at large fails to acknowledge the well-
GRFXPHQWHGIDFWWKDWWHFKQRORJLHVµVXFKDVKLJK-yielding crop varieties, agrochemicals and 
mechanization have primarily benefited the better resource groups in society and transnational 
corporations, UDWKHUWKDQWKHPRVWYXOQHUDEOHRQHV¶ (IAASTD 2008: 23) and ignores the 
question of distributing the benefits to the most vulnerable groups of society, including 
smallholder farmers. 
([FHSWLRQVWRSDWHQWKROGHUV¶ULJKWVDUHHYHQPRUHOLPLWHG7KH\FDQEHintroduced under the 
TRIPS Agreement26, but practice varies among WTO Member States and the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies interpret the provision narrowly (Yamane 2011). In addition, the TRIPS 
Agreement does not require disclosure of prior informed consent of the country of origin and 
of benefit-sharing in patent applications involving use of PGRFA. Therefore, foreign 
companies may obtain private rights derived from national genetic resources without having 
to adhere to the CBD principles (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002). Although 
it can be argued that such access to resources may not be legitimate, enforceability of CBD 
principles is weak unless mandated and monitored by national legislation. In addition, the 
validity of the patent would be assessed on the basis of the legislation of the country that 
granted it, not the country that provided the genetic resource used.  
Unless the TRIPS Agreement is amended to ensure respect for the CBD principles, the 
implementation and enforceability of such principles would remain elusive (Chouchena-Rojas 
et al. 2005). Importantly, such an amendment would allow access to the WTO dispute 
settlement system for breaches of the CBD requirements, as, unlike the CBD, TRIPS rules are 
enforced through mandatory adjudication and retaliatory sanctions. Several developing 
countries have thus called for an amendment to TRIPS by introducing requirements to 
disclose the origin of genetic material and evidence of prior informed consent and benefit-
sharing in patent applications. The original proposal was supported by 110 WTO Member 
States by 2008, when a strategic alliance was made with the EU and Switzerland calling for a 
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procedural decision to negotiate in parallel the biodiversity amendment and geographical 
indications. No progress has been achieved since.  
Similar calls take place under the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). Since 2010, the IGC undertakes negotiations on new patent 
disclosure requirements, where the MLS could be disclosed as the source of PGRFA27. 
Reaching such agreement would change the course in the IPR realm. 
Ample literature highlights that implementation of UPOV and TRIPS may result in 
contraventions to human rights (UNDP 2000; Correa and Yusuf 1998). The Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the former UN Commission on Human 
Rights declared that there are apparent conflicts between the IPR regime and international 
human rights law, in relation to the transfer of technology to developing countries, the 
consequences of plant variety rights and the patenting of genetically modified organisms for 
the enjoyment oIWKHULJKWWRIRRGELRSLUDF\DQGWKHUHGXFWLRQRIFRPPXQLWLHV¶FRQWURORYHU
their genetic and natural resources and cultural values, etc.28 (Weissbrodt and Schoff 2003). 
Additionally, former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter 
criticized UPOV for restricting farmers¶SULYLOHJH, highlighting concerns arising from the 
VWUHQJWKHQLQJRIEUHHGHUV¶ULJKWVUHgarding the right to food. He further pointed to obstacles in 
public research caused by the intensification of IPRs, and to the need for a broad 
interpretation of the limitations that can be imposed to the patent rights-holder (De Schutter 
2009). Former UN Special Rapporteur on cultural rights Farida Shaheed also stressed tensions 
between IPRs and the right to benefit from scientific progress (Shaheed 2012). Challenging 
the idea that IP protection benefits society as a whole, De Schutter further argued that the 
human rights framework requires investigating primarily who benefits from any technological 
advance, with the needs of the most vulnerable groups at the centre of attention (De Schutter 
2009).  
Concluding remarks 
Fifteen years ago already, the Sub-Commission on Human Rights drew attention to the 
primacy of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements and requested 
the TRIPS Council to take fully into account existing State obligations under international 
human rights instruments. In the meantime, the international community seems to be taking 
the opposite direction. The WTO dispute settlement system is being used at full speed to 
HQIRUFHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIPXOWLODWHUDOWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVRIWHQDJDLQVWGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV¶
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efforts to provide food security for local populations; the activities of multinational 
companies remain largely outside the scope of international law (De Jonge 2011); while a 
complex web of bilateral and regional trade and investment treaties build a WTO-plus global 
legal order enforced through arbitration tribunals, which limit national gRYHUQPHQWV¶
regulatory choices outside whichever guarantees of equity and legitimacy multilateralism 
provides (Cotula 2014). Trade and investment-oriented policies, including IPRs, are gaining a 
de facto supremacy over human rights and environmental treaties, because of their 
enforcement potential and the underlying power of actors and interests involved. At the same 
time, the dramatic extent of patent expansion and market concentration mean that 
enforcement of IPRs is not even needed, DVµthe dominant oligopolists are in a position to 
dictate to farmers the very condiWLRQVRIDFFHVVWRVHHG¶.ORSSHQEXUJPDNLQJDW
the same time public research on novel technologies virtually impossible (Tsioumani et al 
2016).  
The concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing was born in international biodiversity law in 
the early 90s with noble intent. In the meantime, however, the policy and legal landscape 
changed dramatically, first with the establishment of the WTO and adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreement and second through the intensification of neoliberal policies via bilateral and 
regional trade and investment agreements. Does the concept remain promising now, as it was 
at the times of its inception? Has it injected any fairness and justice in research and 
development sphere? Has it come up with a workable defence against IPRs? Entered into 
force almost a decade after the CBD, the ITPGRFA has developed a highly sophisticated 
system to operationalize benefit-sharing at the inter-state level. However, while it has 
introduced a complex web of technical requirements to the exchange of PGRFA, it has not 
succeeded in legally enforcing user-based benefit-sharing (Kloppenburg 2014) and as a result 
very little monetary benefits have been shared. 
To be fair, the MLS is a success in many ways. It facilitated hundreds of thousands of 
exchanges of PGRFA, mainly to enable public agricultural research; it further provided 
valuable support, particularly through non-monetary benefit-sharing to build the capacities 
required for facilitated access to, and use of, PGRFA. It is thus instrumental in building 
endogenously-defined needs and capacities of countries and communities, and bridging the 
fairness and equity gap in agricultural research and development. These successes however 
have been overshadowed by expectations for monetary benefits, in the context of growing 
inequities due to trade policies described above. 
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Should genetic resources, as renewable and non-rivalrous goods, be treated more like 
knowledge than like non-renewable and rivalrous natural resources? Governance and 
management of knowledge faces similar characteristics and similar challenges: a global 
public good, the exchange of which would support solutions to global challenges, which 
however faces various IPR- and access-related restrictions. Opening a dialogue between the 
WZRVHFWRUVVHHPVWLPHO\SDUWLFXODUO\JLYHQWKHLQFUHDVLQJµGHPDWHULDOL]DWLRQ¶RIJHQHWLF
resources, which risks undermining current benefit-sharing obligations and making the 
ITPGRFA and the Nagoya Protocol obsolete: synthetic biology techniques currently make 
possible the reconstruction of a genetic resource on the basis of its genetic information, which 
can easily be transferred electronically without physical access to the resource itself. 
At this stage, sharing is in direct conflict with a political and economic system that is 
increasingly transforming genetic resources and knowledge into commodities. Two 
fundamental assumptions seem to collide. Does IP protection contribute to technological 
innovation and technology transfer as the TRIPS Agreement proclaims? Or does it hamper 
innovation as ample research suggests? Is there a way to bypass the IPR issue to promote 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, and transfer technology to that end? And does 
the currently highly proprietary environment allow us to even imagine the creation and 
protection of a global commons of plant genetic resources (Halewood 2013)? 
Ostrom distinguishes common property regimes from open-access systems: whereas in open-
access systems no one has the legal right to exclude anyone from using a resource, in 
common property regimes the members of a clearly demarcated group have a legal right to 
exclude non-members from using a resource (Hess and Ostrom 2007). Can ideas arising from 
the commons literature, particularly the knowledge commons, be applied in the field of 
agricultural research (Frison 2016)? While the picture of international law appears rather 
gloom at the moment, examples from the grassroots offer rays of hope. The seed inspires: 
moving away from the farmer archetype, new communities are being created, on the basis of 
values, not profit, and engage with exchanges of seeds and preservation of agricultural 
biodiversity. Inspired by the successful experience in the software realm, others partner to 
experiment with the open source development model. While such grassroots initiatives 
remain in an informal and largely unregulated sphere, their impact can be seen in the policy 
realm, with the CGIAR now changing its discourse to talk about research for development, 
and increasingly engaging in participatory plant breeding initiatives (Vernooy et al. 2015). 
Discussing and redefining the boundaries between what must remain in the public domain, 
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what may be managed as a commons and what can be privatized is now more than ever a 
critical issue for regulators and academics alike. 
 
                                                 
1 TRIPS Agreement Article 27(3)(b). 
2 Biopiracy, a term originally coined by civil society organization ETC Group, refers to the 
appropriation of the knowledge and genetic resources of farming and indigenous communities 
by individuals or institutions that seek exclusive monopoly control (patents or IP) over these 
resources and knowledge. 
3 International Undertaking Art. 1. 
4 Art. 2(1). 
5 International Undertaking, Article 7(h)(ii). 
6 International Undertaking, Preamble. 
7 International Undertaking, Art. 7(a). 
8 Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
9 CBD Article 15. 
10 CBD Article 1. 
11 ITPGRFA Article 9. 
12 1992 Nairobi Final Act of the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Resolution 3. 
13 ITPGRFA Article 1.  
14 ITPGRFA Articles 10-13. 
15 ITPGRFA Preamble. 
16 ITPGRFA Articles 11(2) and (5). 
17 ITPGRFA Governing Body Resolution 2/2006 (2006).  
18 SMTA Article 6(7) and Annex 2.  
19 SMTA Article 6(11). 
20 SMTA Article 6(8). 
21 ITPGRFA Articles 13(2)(a) and 17. 
22 I am grateful to former ITPGRFA Secretary Shakeel Bhatti for drawing my attention to this 
point. 
23 Resolution 1/2015, Measures to Enhance the Functioning of the Multilateral System of 
Access and Benefit-Sharing. 
Formatted: English (United Kingdom)
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24 ITPGRFA Article 13(3). 
25 The list of approved projects is available at 
http://www.planttreaty.org/sites/default/files/files/Third%20Call%20for%20Proposals-
%20Projects%20approved%20for%20funding-for%20web.pdf (last visited 1 June 2016). 
26 Article 30 on Exceptions to Rights Conferred. 
27 I am grateful to Claudio Chiarolla for drawing my attention to this point. 
28 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Resolution 2000/7, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7. 
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